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ABSTRACT: I argue that there are at least two concepts of law of nature worthy of 
philosophical interest: strong law and weak law. Strong laws are the laws in-
vestigated by fundamental physics, while weak laws feature prominently in the 
“special sciences” and in a variety of non-scientific contexts. In the first section, I 
clarify my methodology, which has to do with arguing about concepts. In the next 
section, I offer a detailed description of strong laws, which I claim satisfy four 
criteria: (1) If it is a strong law that L then it also true that L; (2) strong laws would 
continue to be true, were the world to be different in some physically possible 
way; (3) strong laws do not depend on context or human interest; (4) strong laws 
feature in scientific explanations but cannot be scientifically explained. I then 
spell out some philosophical consequences: (1) is incompatible with Cartwright’s 
contention that “laws lie” (2) with Lewis’s “best-system” account of laws, and 
(3) with contextualism about laws. In the final section, I argue that weak laws 
are distinguished by (approximately) meeting some but not all of these criteria. I 
provide a preliminary account of the scientific value of weak laws, and argue that 
they cannot plausibly be understood as ceteris paribus laws.
KEY WORDS: Contextualism, counterfactuals, David Lewis, laws of nature, Nancy 
Cartwright, physical necessity.
In this article, I will suggest that there are (at least) two concepts of law 
of nature relevant to understanding scientific and philosophical discourse 
and these two concepts raise interestingly different philosophical prob-
lems. For the sake of clarity, I will call these concepts strong law and weak 
law. In what follows, I will describe these concepts in a little more detail 
and argue that they are, in fact, distinct concepts.1
1 I would like to thank Patrick Maher, Jonathan Waskan, Dan Korman, Bob Wengert, 
and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
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While I think that these results are of independent interest, they also 
have a direct bearing on some of the more traditionally “philosophical” 
debates about laws of nature. Specifically, these results suggest that phi-
losophical attempts to identify the laws of the special sciences with laws 
of physics (e.g., by hypothesizing the existence of hidden ceteris paribus 
clauses) are misguided. For similar reasons, this conclusion also suggests 
that it would be inappropriate to demand that a particular philosophical 
analysis of laws of nature capture every use of the phrase ‘law of nature.’
Arguing About Concepts
In order to argue that there are two distinct concepts of law, I will suggest 
that certain paradigmatically correct uses of ‘law of nature’ are incommen-
surable with other, also paradigmatically correct, uses of this phrase. This 
argument is premised on the fact that competent users (e.g., practicing 
scientists) of ‘law’ terminology are not massively mistaken in their judg-
ments (or “intuitions”) about laws in cases where these errors cannot be 
attributed to factual ignorance. So, for example, if such speakers regularly 
use appeals to ‘laws of nature’ to support counterfactuals or to ground ex-
planations, we have good reason to think that there is a concept of law that 
is closely tied up with explanation and counterfactual truth. The cogency 
of this argument hinges on the assumption that competent speakers are, 
at least to some extent, authorities on how their concepts work. I do not 
take this to be a controversial assumption.2 It does not rule out speakers 
being massively wrong about matters of fact (e.g., they falsely believe 
that F=MA is a law in cases where this error can be attributed to some 
sort of factual ignorance [e.g., they are unaware of Einstein’s arguments]). 
It merely means that, absence evidence of inconsistency, charity requires 
that we assume that competent speakers are using their concepts correctly. 
In any case, it borders on incoherence to claim that speakers of a language 
are massively mistaken about the way that their own concepts are applied. 
They have helped to improve it immeasurably. Any remaining mistakes or omissions are 
of course my own.
2 I will often speak of ‘concepts’ as being something like the meanings of terms. 
The premise about the authority of competent speakers is compatible with, but does not 
require, Bealer’s (1996, 2002) and Jackson’s (1994, 1998) view that people have a priori 
access to their own concepts. So, for example, this premise would also fit well with Gold-
man’s (1999) “naturalized” defense of intuitions. Goldman argues that naturalists ought 
to accept that competent speakers’ intuitions (“conscious, spontaneous judgments”) are a 
reliable indicator of whether a certain concept can be correctly applied, where concepts are 
non-conscious psychological states closely associated with the application of certain natu-
ral-language predicates. Goldman holds that speakers’ intuitions provide us with strong a 
posteriori evidence about the extensions of various concepts (21–23).
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So, if we discover that competent speakers have consistently believed that 
were Newtonian mechanics to have been true, then F=MA would have 
been a law, we have strong prima facie reasons to trust their judgments.
With this in mind, I will assume that if we can find clear criteria for 
applying phrases like ‘law of nature’ in one context and different (and 
inconsistent) criteria for applying ‘law of nature’ in another context, we 
can provisionally conclude that there are at least two concepts of law at 
work. The claim that the concept weak law is derivative (or merely metap-
horical) can be dealt with in a similar way. As a matter of historical fact, 
it seems likely that the strong concept of law preceded the weaker one, 
and that the weaker concept came into use with the perception that certain 
other principles were like these strong laws in some way. This historical 
fact does not entail that the concept of weak law is illegitimate, however, 
nor that it can be identified with the strong concept. After all, some histo-
rians have hypothesized that the original concept of law of nature (which 
I have called strong law) originated in a metaphorical application of legal 
concepts to the natural world.3
It is also important to note a few things that I am not claiming. First, 
while I think it is clear that a satisfactory account of laws of nature must 
pay careful attention to scientists’ (and philosophers’) current and histo-
rical use of “law” language, it would be a mistake to suppose that this 
is the only (or even the most important) criteria by which a philosophi-
cal account of laws must be judged. After all, scientists use law termi-
nology somewhat inconsistently, and there is thus little reason to suspect 
that a philosophical account that aimed at capturing all and only those 
principles that scientists actually called “laws” would be either coherent 
or interesting. Instead, my investigation will be aimed at explicating two 
concepts of law that play significantly different roles in scientific inquiry. 
The account will be successful to the extent that it accurately describes 
these concepts. Second, I will not be claiming that current scientific prac-
3 The precise relationship between the legal and scientific concepts of law has been 
a matter of some debate. Zilsel (1942) and Needham (1951a, 1951b) contend that the 
scientific concept is essentially a straightforward application (by Descartes) of the legal 
concept onto the natural world, where God fills the role of a legislator. More complex (but 
roughly congruent) stories are given by Oakley (1961) and Ott (2009), who contend that 
the Cartesian concept of law is closely tied up with Descartes’s beliefs concerning either 
(a) theistic voluntarism (i.e., the thesis that God is entirely free to act upon the world and 
is not constrained by the internal “essences” of things) or (b) natural law theory, which ap-
plied legal concepts to the moral world. Other writers have contended that the relationship 
between the two concepts of law is much more distant; for example, Ruby (1986) contends 
that the scientific concept of law arose from an analogy with mathematical or logical laws, 
and not from any direct analogy with legal concepts.
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tice has discovered any strong or weak laws, or even that scientific inquiry 
is likely to discover such laws in the future. My (weaker) claim is simply 
that scientific practice (both historical and current) regularly makes claims 
about these two different sorts of laws, and that scientists regularly inter-
pret observations as confirming or disconfirming claims about laws. In my 
conclusion, I will argue that even this relatively weak result has significant 
consequences for philosophical accounts of lawhood.
The First Concept of Law: Strong Law
I will label the first concept of law strong law. I will argue that strong laws 
(1) correspond to strict regularities, (2) are counterfactually robust, (3) do 
not depend on human interests or contexts, and (4) bear distinctive rela-
tions to explanations. Strong laws are the sorts of laws that those work-
ing on fundamental physical theory aim to discover, and are the types of 
laws relevant to philosophical debates about free will, physicalism, and 
induction. In a certain sense, the concept strong law is a relatively easy 
one to understand and examples of examples of theories that posit strong 
laws can easily be found. For example, in a universe governed by classi-
cal physics, Newton’s laws of motion would be strong laws, as would his 
law of universal gravitation. Similarly, the equations of general relativity 
(GR) or quantum mechanics (QM) would plausibly express strong laws if 
true. So might the law of conservation of mass-energy and the second law 
of thermodynamics. Conversely, the “law of supply and demand” of eco-
nomics is not a candidate for being a strong law, nor are the “laws” of folk 
psychology. I recognize that these examples are not entirely uncontrover-
sial, and I will try to provide some motivation for accepting them in what 
follows.4
I take it that the concept of strong law is relatively clear. Moreover, it 
does not seem to be a concept that is of solely philosophical or historical 
interest, since one can easily find examples of physicists (mainly cosmo-
logists) using law terminology in much the same manner that it is used 
historically (e.g., by Descartes or Newton). So, for example:
4 Roberts (2004) and Kincaid (2004) provide a useful discussion of the differences 
(and similarities) between the principles appealed to in physics (including fundamental 
physical theory) and those appealed to in the social sciences (which includes principles 
such as the law of supply and demand). My own account suggests that there is perhaps a 
middle ground to be found in the debate over whether there are “laws” in the social sci-
ences. In particular, my account of strong laws fits well with Roberts’s characterization 
of the sorts of laws posited by fundamental physical theory (which he argues correspond 
to regularities and have a distinctive modal character), while my account of weak laws 
mirrors in important ways Kincaid’s discussion of the role that “laws” play in the social 
sciences. 
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1. “For, like every other general law of nature, the law of transmission 
of light in vacuo must, according to the principle of relativity, be 
the same for the railway carriage as reference-body as when the 
rails are the body of reference.” (Einstein, 1921, 23).
2. “[Y]ou can guess already from my introduction that I am intere-
sted not so much in the human mind as in the marvel of nature 
which can obey such an elegant and simple law as this law of 
gravitation.” (Feynman, 1965, 24).
3. “What laws govern our universe? How shall we know them? How 
may this knowledge help us to comprehend the world and hence 
guide its actions to our advantage?” (Penrose, 2004, 7).
When used in contexts such as these, the terms ‘law’ and ‘law of 
nature’ are being used to pick out some fundamental principle of the uni-
verse, knowledge of which is explanatory. Such authors regularly refer to 
the laws as “governing” the universe and refrain from offering any sugge-
stion that the laws of nature should be understood as true relative only to 
some particular context or purpose. Such authors are reasonably interpre-
ted as making claims about strong laws.
A number of prominent philosophical discussions of laws of nature 
can also be construed as pertaining to strong laws. In particular, philosophi-
cal discussions of laws that emphasize features such as laws’ universality, 
their correspondence with strict regularities, and their sense of necessity 
can profitably be interpreted as being about strong laws. So, for example, 
consider Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948, 152–157) influential descrip-
tion of what they call fundamental laws. Hempel and Oppenheim state 
that fundamental laws are “universal” principles of “non-limited scope” 
that cannot themselves be derived from laws that are more fundamental. 
They also claim that such laws form a sort of explanatory bedrock, inso-
far as they can be appealed to in explanations but cannot themselves be 
explained. Finally, like Newton and Descartes, Hempel and Oppenheim 
explicitly deny the idea that lawhood might be relativized to a particular 
community’s interests or evidence. Instead, laws are objective. Something 
like this conception of laws also seems to be at the heart of more recent 
debates about the reducibility (or irreducibility) of laws. So, for example, 
both Lewis (1973) and Armstrong (1983) agree with many of Hempel and 
Oppenheim’s claims about the general characteristics of laws.
With these uses of ‘law of nature’ in mind, we are in a position to 
make some general remarks about the distinctive features of strong laws. 
In this section, I propose to do just that, but with one major caveat: I will 
not be arguing that we have any justified beliefs about what the strong 
laws actually are, nor will I argue that there even exist any strong laws. 
My goal here is much more modest–I will simply aim to articulate what 
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strong laws must be, if they are to be the types of things described in pre-
vious section. I will suggest that there are four distinctive characteristics 
of strong laws:
1. If it is a strong law that L then it is true that L.
2. If it is a strong law that L then, if it were the case that some physi-
cally contingent proposition P were true, then L would still be a 
strong law. For example, suppose that it really were the case that 
Newton’s law of gravitation was a law of nature in our world. 
Then it should also be the case that this principle would remain a 
law, even on the supposition that physically contingent facts about 
our world (i.e., facts not necessitated by the laws of nature, such 
as those concerning the initial conditions of the universe) were 
different than they actually are.
3. The truth or falsity of the claim that L is a strong law is objective 
and context-independent.
4. If it is a strong law that L then L cannot be given a scientific expla-
nation.
These points will undoubtedly be controversial to some readers, and 
I will present some reasons for accepting each. My main interest here, 
however, is not to definitively settle open philosophical or scientific de-
bates about the nature of strong laws; rather, the idea is to identify a parti-
cular concept of law essential to understanding specific parts of scientific 
practice (and in particular, fundamental physical theory). In the next sec-
tion, I will suggest that weak laws are distinguished by the fact that they 
lack one or more of these characteristics.
Strong Laws and Truth
The first distinctive characteristic of strong laws concerns truth. In par-
ticular, it seems plausible that, if the proposition it is a strong law that L 
is true, then L is true as well.5 Descartes, for instance, explicitly claims 
that the laws he has discovered would hold in any universe God created, 
which clearly implies that such laws hold in our own universe. This prin-
ciple has also been widely accepted in the philosophical literature on laws. 
So, for example, Humean reductionists such as Hempel and Lewis offer 
analyses according to which laws are identified with true sentences or true 
propositions, respectively; Hempel claims that laws are simply univer-
5 This formulation assumes that L is a proposition. One might also express this prin-
ciple in ontic terms (i.e., in terms of whatever it is that makes L true). For example, “If L is 
a strong law, then there are no violations of or exceptions to L.”
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sal generalizations that contain the appropriate types of predicates, while 
Lewis argues that they are extremely succinct summaries of the masses 
of particular facts. Similarly, the classic non-Humean accounts of Tooley, 
Dretske, and Armstrong conclude that propositions expressing laws of na-
ture are in some strong sense necessary and thus, trivially, will be true in 
the actual world.
There are, of course, some well-known arguments concerning the 
“falsity” of laws. However, I do not think that these arguments, even if 
successful, threaten the analysis given here. So, for example, both Car-
twright (1983, 1999, 2002) and Giere (1999) have argued that many pa-
radigmatic claims about laws of nature would, even if true, fail to entail 
the existence of strict, exceptionless regularities.6 To illustrate this point, 
Cartwright (1983) offers an extended argument that Newton’s law of uni-
versal gravitation would fail to correspond to a strict regularity even if the 
facts about gravitation were exactly as Newton claimed they were. More 
specifically, she claims that if Newton’s law of gravitation is interpreted 
as entailing any claim about the actual net acceleration experienced by 
massive bodies, then this claim will be false at nearly every Newtonian 
world. This is because massive objects in Newtonian worlds are almost 
always subject to other, non-gravitational forces that affects their accele-
ration.
According to Cartwright, the “falsity” of the law of gravitation need 
not prevent it from counting as a law at Newtonian worlds. This is because 
the law of gravitation does capture something related to acceleration–i.e., 
it captures the power or capacity of massive bodies to attract one another. 
So, on Cartwright’s view, the proposition it is a law of nature that any pair 
of massive bodies will experience an attractive force inversely proportio-
nal to the square of their distance will be true just in the case that massive 
bodies have a capacity to attract one another that varies inversely by the 
square of their distance. By itself, however, the law does not entail anyt-
hing about the existence of any regularity, strict or otherwise. Moreover, 
according to Cartwright, this problem is a fully general one, and one that 
cannot be overcome by noting the possibility that there exist laws gover-
ning additional forces (i.e., a Newtonian could not escape the problem 
by noting that the acceleration due to charge difference is captured by 
Coulomb’s law).
6 Cartwright’s and Giere’s arguments focus mostly on causal laws within fundamental 
physics. There are, of course, a variety of laws that would correspond to strict regularities 
if true–e.g., the law of conservation of mass-energy or the law that light has a maximum 
velocity. Cartwright’s and Giere’s claim is that this is not a universal feature of the laws 
discussed in fundamental physical theory.
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Cartwright (1983, 54–74) offers an extended argument against the vi-
ability of the view that the law of gravitation and Coulomb’s law describe 
component forces (e.g., that they describe gravitational force or electrical 
force). She has also repeatedly expressed pessimism about the very possi-
bility of scientists’ discovering a comprehensive “network” of laws that 
would jointly entail strict regularities. For example, in an early discussion 
of the covering-law model of explanation, she writes as follows:
Covering-law theorists tend to think that nature is well-regulated; in the ex-
treme, that there is a law to cover every case. I do not. I imagine that natu-
ral objects are much like people in societies. Their behavior is constrained 
by some specific laws and by a handful of general principles, but it is not 
determined in detail, even statistically. What happens on most occasions is 
dictated by no law at all …My claim is that this picture is as plausible as the 
alternative. God may have written just a few laws and grown tired. We do not 
know whether we are in a tidy universe or an untidy one. (1983: 49)
According to Cartwright, then, it is simply false that paradigmatic laws of 
nature entail strict regularities.
Several things can be said in response to such arguments. The first is 
that it is unclear whether Cartwright’s arguments (even if successful) entail 
that (1) strong laws are very different from what most people take them 
to be (because they fail to entail the existence of strict regularities) or (2) 
there simply are no (actual) instances of strong laws. Insofar as our current 
aim is to describe a concept in actual use, the latter may provide a more 
plausible interpretation. If this is the case, then Cartwright’s arguments 
can safely be put aside, since (as mentioned previously) I am claiming nei-
ther that there are any strong laws, nor that we can have any knowledge of 
any particular strong laws. Even if Cartwright is correct in her claim that 
Newton’s laws do not entail regularities, for instance, it seems implausible 
to think that Newton (and his successors) understood them in this way. In 
the Principia, for instance, Newton seems quite optimistic about the po-
ssibility of (accurately) capturing the net forces that bodies are subject to 
via a system of laws modeled on his law of gravitation.
The Necessity of Strong Laws
The second distinctive characteristic of strong laws concerns their sense of 
“necessity” or “invariance” under various sorts of actual and counterfac-
tual changes. Strong laws, unlike merely accidental generalizations, hold 
no matter what. So, for instance, most would grant that it is impossible for 
humans to break strong laws, even if some may argue for the metaphysi-
cal possibility of supernatural (i.e., “miraculous”) violations of the law. 
Similarly, it seems plausible that strong laws would have continued to 
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hold, even if physically contingent matters of fact were to be different than 
they actually are. So, for instance, had President Bush ordered a nuclear 
assault in response to the 9/11 attacks, the particular matters-of-fact about 
our world would have been far different than they actually are; however, 
the strong laws would be precisely the same. This distinctive relation be-
tween strong laws and counterfactual conditionals has been widely recog-
nized by philosophers working on both topics. So, for example, Goodman 
(1947), Kneale (1950) and Stalnaker (1968) all affirm the principle that 
the laws of nature will be preserved under counterfactual antecedents with 
which they are logically consistent. The idea that a satisfactory analysis 
of laws should capture (something like this) relation with counterfactuals 
has been accepted by partisans of every stripe, including primitivists such 
as Carroll (1994, 7–10) and Lange (2000, 2005) and Humeans such as 
Urbach (1988), Ward (2003, 2005, 2007), and Roberts (1999, 2008).
The most commonly cited reason for denying the special relation 
between laws and counterfactuals involves its incompatibility with David 
Lewis’s account of counterfactual semantics. Lewis argues (very roughly) 
that a counterfactual of the form were P the case, then Q would be the case 
is true just in the case that there are no worlds in which P is true and Q is 
false that are as similar to (or as “close to”) to the actual world as worlds 
in which P and Q are both true. When considering the role that laws of 
nature ought to play in evaluating counterfactuals, Lewis considers and 
rejects the thesis that any world with the same laws of nature as the actual 
world will be more similar to the actual world than any world with diffe-
rent laws. In particular, Lewis argues that worlds with “small” miracles 
allowing the occurrence of P are more similar to the actual world than 
worlds with the same laws in which P holds because of differences in past 
particular matters of fact.7
While a critique of Lewis’s proposed semantics for counterfactuals 
is obviously beyond the scope of this project, we can provide a response 
adequate to our purpose here. Lewis’s argument against the thesis that 
laws have a special relationship to counterfactuals is based on considera-
7 Lewis’s argument is as follows: 
Suppose a certain roulette wheel in a deterministic world i stops on black at a time 
t, and consider the counterfactual antecedent that it stopped on red. What sorts of 
antecedent-worlds are closest to i? On the one hand, we have antecedent-worlds 
where the deterministic laws of i hold without exception, but where the wheel is 
determined to stop on red by particular facts different from those of i. Since the laws 
are deterministic, the particular matters of fact must be different at all times before 
time t, no matter how far back …On the other hand, we have antecedent-worlds 
…where the laws of i hold almost without exception; but where a small, localized, 
inconspicuous miracle at t or just before permits the wheel to stop on red in viola-
tion of the laws (1973: 75). 
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tions that are quite far removed from scientific practice or ordinary use–in 
particular, Lewis’s argument assumes that the evaluation of counterfactual 
conditionals requires the consideration of concrete, non-actual worlds and 
that such worlds can be ranked according to objective similarity matrices. 
Neither of these premises can be directly vindicated by appeal to speci-
fic aspects of the way people understand counterfactuals; instead, they 
are theory-laden assumptions whose plausibility is taken to rest on the 
formidable apparatus of Lewis’s proposed semantics for counterfactuals. 
So, insofar as we are interested in describing a concept of actual scientific 
practice, the fact that certain aspects of its application seem to conflict 
with a technical philosophical theory need not immediately concern us8.
In any case, if strong laws are necessary in this sense, then they can-
not be mere “summaries” of occurrent facts, as many have claimed. Nota-
bly, this means that our conception of strong law is incompatible with the 
“best system” account of law defended by Mill, Ramsey, and Lewis. This 
thesis identifies the laws of nature with the consequences of the axioms 
of our simplest, strongest true theory of the world.9 Lewis describes the 
view as follows:
Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler, bet-
ter systematized than others. Some are stronger, more informative than oth-
ers. These virtues compete: an uninformative system can be very simple, 
an unsystematized compendium of miscellaneous information can be very 
informative. The best system is the one that strikes as good a balance as truth 
will allow between simplicity and strength …A regularity is a law iff it is a 
theorem of the best system. (Lewis, 1994: 478)
Following Lewis, I will define the thesis as follows:
(MRL) L is a strong law if and only if L is a theorem of the true physi-
cal theory that best balances strength and simplicity.10
Strength here is intended as a measure of the information conveyed by the 
theory, while simplicity measures its economy of expression in a certain 
language. There are a number of prima facie problems that arise when one 
 8 Lewis (1979) suggests that, in general, we will judge that even small violations of 
laws render a world “less similar” to our own than do massive changes in particular matters 
of fact, and attempts to modify his semantics for counterfactuals to partially account for 
this fact. This suggests that Lewis recognizes this aspect of the ordinary concept of law, 
even if his proposed semantics for counterfactuals cannot entirely account for it.
 9 The view is first articulated by Mill (1874) and is later developed by Ramsey 
(1978). Lewis first proposes the view in his (1973: 73–74). Most contemporary formula-
tions take Lewis’s formulation as a starting-point.
10 Lewis (1994) requires that candidate theories also be evaluated for how probable 
they make the actual distribution of non-nomic facts; Lewis calls this criterion that of fit. 
Since this is irrelevant to the discussion here, I’ve left it out.
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tries to make these concepts more precise–for example, a good definition 
of strength should privilege useful information over mere listing of facts, 
and a good definition of simplicity should not end up being language-
relative.11 I will assume in what follows that some satisfactory account of 
these notions can be found.
The root problem with MRL is that it cannot account for the dis-
tinction between laws of nature and accidental generalizations–that is, it 
cannot account for the necessity of strong laws. To see why, consider the 
following propositions:
(U) There are no spheres of uranium more than a mile in diameter.
(G) There are no spheres of gold more than a mile in diameter.
It is plausible that, in the actual world, both U and G are true but that only 
U is a strong law. MRL can capture this distinction only if the inclusion 
of U, but not G, results in the deductive theory that best balances strength 
and simplicity. Since G’s inclusion would strengthen the theory, its exclu-
sion can only be justified by appeal to the loss of simplicity. Whatever the 
success of this maneuver in the actual world, there are reasons to think that 
the strength and simplicity criteria cannot generally track the distinction 
between laws and accidental generalizations. Consider, for instance, the 
class of worlds that are populated only by gold spheres that are slightly 
smaller than a mile in a diameter. It seems reasonable to think that, on any 
reasonable weighting of strength and simplicity, G (or something similar) 
will count as a law by the MRL criteria. After all, the inclusion of G in our 
theory would allow for considerable predictive and descriptive power at 
such worlds. There is no independent reason, however, to think that G is 
a strong law in every such world. In particular, it seems plausible to claim 
that at least one of these worlds has the same laws as the actual world, ac-
cording to which G is not physically necessary.12 But, if this is the case, 
then the best system account fails as a definition of strong law.
11 For examples of some of the problems that arise with Lewis’s original treatment of 
these concepts, see Armstrong (1983) and van Fraassen (1989). In response to these wor-
ries, Earman (1986, 87–90) and Loewer (1996) both offer revised definitions of strength 
and/or simplicity.
12 Roberts (2008) has criticized MRL on the related grounds that it cannot distinguish 
widespread regularities that are the result of nomically contingent initial conditions from 
those regularities that are not so contingent. Roberts argues that this distinction is at the 
heart of “fine-tuning” arguments and plays a central role in scientific reasoning. In particu-
lar, scientists and philosophers have usually assumed that the first type of regularities, but 
not the second, must be given some explanation. In many cases, this belief has served as a 
stimulus to productive scientific theorizing. As an example, Roberts offers the following 
case: Laplace’s nebular hypothesis was proposed to explain the fact that all the planets 
orbited on approximately the same plane, a fact which Newton had claimed resulted from 
God’s arbitrary will. Laplace, but not Newton, hypothesized that this regularity resulted 
from nomically contingent initial conditions and was thus explicable.
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The above example shows that being included in the best system is 
not a sufficient condition for a proposition’s being a strong law. Other 
examples can be constructed to show that MRL fails to provide necessary 
conditions for lawhood. Consider the case of unobtainium, a hypothetical 
element discussed by Lewis (1994). Suppose that there are certain princi-
ples governing unobtainium’s rate of decay analogous to those governing 
the decay-rates of other particles. For example, it may be that unobtainium 
has a 0.5 chance of decaying over 10,000 years. Further suppose, howe-
ver, there only ever exists a single atom of unobtainium, and that it decays 
in exactly 9,520 years. Lewis’s worry is that, in such scenarios, MRL may 
generate an incorrect law concerning unobtainium’s rate of decay. There is 
a broader concern however: MRL may be incompatible with there existing 
any laws governing unobtainium at all. After all, if unobtainium is extre-
mely rare, and if there exist no derived laws concerning its rate of decay, 
it is unlikely that the inclusion of a statement describing unobtainium’s 
rate of decay in our axiomatized theory will strengthen this theory enough 
to outweigh the corresponding loss of simplicity. So, MRL will entail that 
there is no law governing unobtainium’s rate of decay. Since an element’s 
rate of decay is a paradigmatic example of a law-governed process, this 
shows that MRL fails to provide necessary conditions for lawhood.
The Objectivity of Strong Laws
The third distinctive characteristic of strong laws concerns their objectiv-
ity, where ‘objectivity’ means that the truth of claims such as L is a law of 
nature do not depend upon features such as the speaker’s interest in assert-
ing the claim or on the context in which the statement is being considered. 
Early users of the law-concept (such as Descartes and Newton) clearly 
take the laws of nature to represent objective matters of fact. This assump-
tion has also been shared by the majority of their scientific successors and 
by the scientifically literate folk when they engage in discussions about 
what the laws of nature are. It has also been shared by most philosophers 
who have written about laws. There is thus a strong prima facie assump-
tion that there is a concept of law according to which the truth of L is a 
law of nature depends only on non-contextual, non-subjective aspects of 
the physical world.
Unsurprisingly, there are at least a few analyses of law of nature 
according to which paradigmatic strong laws fail to be objective in this 
sense. In particular, some recent presentations of MRL-style views have 
advocated subjectivism or contextualism in order to solve the sorts of pro-
blems mentioned previously. Many of these accounts have purported to 
do this by explicitly defining the notion of best system in terms of the 
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theory, perspective, or context within which it is evaluated. So, for exam-
ple, Roberts (1999, 2001) has argued for an “indexical” interpretation of 
the best-system analysis of laws, Halpin (1998, 1999, 2003) has argued 
for a Humean “perspectival” account of laws and physical probability, 
and Ward (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007) has argued for a “projectivist” 
account. In each case, the general move has been to reconcile the apparent 
differences between MRL and our normal way of thinking about strong 
laws by appealing to some feature of the context in which the laws are 
being considered. The consideration of context, which includes factors 
such as language, world, and the purpose for which a theory is being used, 
allows for the possibility of there existing multiple theories that best ba-
lance of strength and simplicity, and thus, for their being multiple systems 
of “laws of nature”.13 For example, these authors suggest that the possibi-
lity of there being different laws in worlds with the same non-nomic facts 
is explained by the fact that which laws hold is determined partially by 
contextual features. One possible advantage of these approaches is that 
they give more determinate content to the overly vague notions of strength 
and simplicity. A second is that they might be able to better capture the 
distinction between laws and accidents.
I will not pursue objections to these specific accounts in detail, but it 
is worth noting a few ways in which these accounts diverge from our con-
cept of strong law. First, these accounts entail that which propositions are 
laws of nature at a world will depend on the context in which that world 
is being considered. So, when considering the class of gold-sphere worlds 
described above, it is open for defenders of context-sensitivity to say that, 
depending on the context in which these worlds are being considered, G 
might be a law in all of these worlds, or some of them, or none of them. 
The same can be said for the analogous class of uranium-sphere worlds. 
The problem with this solution is that it fails to fully account for the dif-
fering ways in which we treat propositions such as U and G. In particular, 
no reasons have been provided for thinking that our actual judgments con-
cerning U and G are a function of context. After all, we seem to be con-
sidering the propositions in quite similar contexts–we are assuming that 
13 Halpin’s characterization of perspective is representative of what I am calling 
“context”: 
First, it determines a language for all candidate theories. This language is the basis for the 
second aspect of perspective: standards of strength, simplicity, and fit. These notions we saw to 
be language dependent. Third, a perspective involves particular scientific methodologies and 
preferences – i.e. a scientific culture provides an understanding of the appropriate ways that 
scientific theorizing may proceed. (2003: 151) 
Context in the above sense might be thought of, very generally, as being made up of eve-
rything the agent brings to the table with her when considering which theory (and which 
set of laws) to endorse. 
426 Prolegomena 12 (2) 2013
these propositions are true, and are concerned in figuring out whether or 
not they would continue to be true, were the world to be changed in some 
way. It is difficult what feature of the context might explain our differing 
judgments. By contrast, there are very good reasons for supposing that the 
differences in the way we treat these propositions is an effect of our beliefs 
about the objective makeup of the world. In particular, it reflects our beli-
efs about the differing atomic makeup of gold and uranium, and the effects 
that this difference would make in the scenario we are considering. For 
this reason, I think contextualism fails as an account of how our concept 
of strong law actually works. This doesn’t entail, of course, that contextu-
alism might not have other redeeming virtues (for example, if we disco-
vered that strong laws as ordinarily conceived of do not exist, embracing 
contextualism may provide a convenient “fall-back” position allowing us 
to preserve something of what was valuable about talk of laws).
A second problem concerns the opacity of the contextual notions to 
those engaged in debates over the laws of nature. In particular, it is difficult 
to see how a scientist could determine whether others engaged in a certain 
debate with her share her context. So, for instance, suppose that Marie is 
in a debate with a researcher who (1) agrees with her on the results of all 
actual experiments that have been and will be performed but (2) disagrees 
with her on what the results of certain counterfactual experiments would 
be. For example, suppose he claims that, were a certain experiment E to 
be performed in a perfect vacuum, then R1 would be the result while she 
claims that, were this experiment to be performed in a perfect vacuum, R2 
would be the case. If both Marie and her colleague agree that perfect va-
cuums do not (and will not) exist, this cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
a disagreement about any non-nomic feature of the world. If one conjoins 
these contextualist views with some reasonable principle of charity, it wo-
uld seem that Marie ought to interpret her disagreement with her colleague 
as an equivocation resulting from a difference in context. But this is false, 
since Marie is clearly right in interpreting her colleague as genuinely di-
sagreeing with her. More generally, there do not seem to be any plausible 
examples of fundamental laws that vary according to context. Canonical 
descriptions of laws of nature by both classical and modern physicists 
(e.g., Descartes, Newton, Einstein, Feynman, or Hawking) never assign 
context anything like the role it plays on these sorts of views.
In any case, there is no need to present a knockdown argument against 
such views here. Whatever the merits of these contextualist views may be, 
no reasons have been provided for thinking that this lack of objectivity is 
a feature of the ordinary concept strong law. None of the previously men-
tioned authors argue for this claim based on appeals to current practice, 
however; instead, they claim that the thesis that the laws are subjective 
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allows them to account for the laws’ relation to counterfactuals without 
positing any problematic entities or relations.14 Such analyses of ‘law of 
nature’ may or may not be successful as proposals for how we should 
speak about laws (i.e., they may succeed as explicata), but we have little 
reason to accept them as descriptions of concepts already in use (i.e., as 
clarifications of the explicandum).
Strong Laws and Explanation
The final distinctive characteristic of strong laws concerns their asymmet-
ric relationship to explanation. In particular, while strong laws can often 
be used to provide scientific explanations of certain events or phenomena, 
they themselves cannot be given such explanations.
The use of strong laws in explanations has been widely recognized, so 
I will not argue for it here. As an example, consider Newton’s Principia, 
which shows how the laws of Newtonian mechanics and the law of gravi-
tation can be used to explain why the heavenly bodies move in the speeds 
and directions that they were known to move in.
More importantly for the purpose of distinguishing strong laws from 
weak laws, it does not seem that strong laws themselves can be given 
scientific explanations.15 For example, if Newton had been correct in his 
claim that his laws of motion were the fundamental laws of the universe, 
then it would have been impossible to explain why these laws held in 
scientifically acceptable terms. This is reflected by the fact, when we are 
given a scientific explanation for why a certain ‘law’ holds, we will no 
longer regard as being a ‘law’ in the same sense. So, in explaining why 
Kepler’s laws of planetary motion and Galileo’s law of free-fall yielded 
correct predictions, Newton showed that they were not strong laws. This 
14 Ward defends the failure of projectivism to match up with our intuitions about the 
“factual status of laws” by noting that (1) the complexity of the projectivist analysis can 
explain why people may not have noticed that they are secretly projectivists and (2) “in 
light of that explanation, the naive intuition does not demand to be vindicated. Our judg-
ment regarding the factual status of laws should be made in light of the respective merits 
and demerits of the candidate analyses once they’ve been properly formulated” (2002: 
212).
15 It is worth emphasizing the import of the scientific modifier here. Both Descartes 
and Newton thought that one could explain why the universe had the laws it did by refer-
ence to God’s actions; a similar view is defended by Foster (2001, 2004). On these views, 
it is nevertheless the case that strong laws represent a sort of scientific explanatory bed-
rock–no explanation of the laws can be given without explicit mention of a God. The same 
might be said for explanations of complex laws that proceed by mathematically deduc-
ing them from known laws. In such cases, the explanation might appropriately be called 
“mathematical” as opposed to “scientific.”
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intuition is also reflected in many philosophical theories of explanation. 
I have already noted Hempel’s and Oppenheim’s (1948) “covering law” 
theory of explanation, according to which explanation proceeds by deduc-
tion from fundamental laws. By definition, such accounts of explanation 
cannot be applied to the explanation of strong laws themselves. The same 
phenomenon arises if one attempts to explain strong laws according to uni-
ficationist, mechanist, or counterfactual views of explanation. We can cite 
no further natural regularity that “unites” strong laws, no “mechanism” 
underlying their obtaining, and no particular state of affairs the obtaining 
of which is counterfactually related to the strong laws in the correct way.
The Second Concept of Law: Weak Law
I have argued that there is a scientifically significant concept of law of na-
ture that picks out propositions that are true, objective, and bear distinctive 
relations to counterfactuals and explanation. I called this concept strong 
law. In this section, I will argue that strong law is not the only concept of 
law of nature that is relevant to scientific practice. More specifically, I will 
argue that certain (also paradigmatically correct) uses of phrases like ‘law 
of nature’ cannot plausibly be taken as pertaining to strong laws, since 
they violate at least one of the criteria laid out above. For the sake of con-
venience, I will call the concept associated with these other sorts of uses 
weak law. This concept approximates in certain ways the more familiar 
concept of ceteris paribus law. However, there are also significant differ-
ences between these concepts, which I will discuss in more detail later.
Paradigmatic weak laws include many of the important principles of 
the special sciences. One might also include (as borderline cases) such 
analogical uses of law-terminology such as “Murphy’s laws” or “the laws 
of dating.” All such uses of law-terminology share some significant simi-
larities to the strong laws described above, but these putative laws fail to 
qualify as strong laws by the criteria offered there. With this in mind, here 
are some principles that, while appropriately called ‘laws’ in some sense, 
are clearly not strong laws:
1. Newton’s second law (mechanics): The relationship between an 
object’s mass m, its acceleration a, and the force applied to it F is 
given by the formula F=ma.
2. Galileo’s law of free-fall: A body in free fall near the earth will 
accelerate at 9.8 m/sec2.
3. Boyle’s law (thermodynamics): For a gas held at a fixed tem-
perature, the product of the pressure p and volume V is equal to a 
fixed constant k. The laws is expressed by the formula pV=k.
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4. Bode’s laws (astronomy): The mean distance a of planet n from 
the sun is described by the formula a=(n+4)/10, where earth’s 
mean distance = 1, and n = 0,3,6,12,24,….
5. Thorndike’s law of effect (psychology): A behavior that produ-
ces a satisfying effect in a given scenario is more likely to be re-
peated in future scenarios of the same type than a behavior that 
produces an uncomfortable effect.
6. Mendel’s law of inheritance (genetics): The inheritance pattern 
shown by one trait will be independent of that shown by other 
traits.
7. The law of demand (economics): If the price of a good is redu-
ced, demand will increase; if the price is increased, demand will 
decrease.
8. The exponential law of population growth/Malthus’s law (po-
pulation ecology): So long as the environment is stable, a popula-
tion will grow or shrink exponentially.
9. Dollo’s law (evolutionary biology): Evolution is irreversible–no 
organism will have the exact same traits that some distant ancestor 
did.
10. Fodor’s law (folk psychology): If someone desires D, she will try 
to get D.
I assume that each of the uses (with the probable exception of “Fodor’s 
law”) above represents a plausible use of the word ‘law’, at least if uttered 
in an appropriate context. One can find numerous references to laws such 
as these in peer-reviewed scientific journals and philosophy of science 
textbooks. This suggests that the claim that “Newton’s second law is not a 
law” is blatantly (if not analytically) false.16 It only makes sense to deny 
that Newton’s laws are laws if one already has a particular analysis of 
lawhood in mind. If one adopts this stance, however, once must grant that 
one is no longer talking about the concept of law that is relevant to the 
actual use of Newton’s laws, and that one is instead relying on a philosop-
hical theory of laws. One might also object to the lawhood of the above 
16 Some readers may think that I have overstated the case here a bit. After all, I’ve 
previously argued that Newton intended to make claims about strong laws; understood 
this way, it is clearly true that Newton’s laws are not laws. However, I think that argu-
ing this way is to miss the point. There is a perfect legitimate sense in which Newton’s 
laws are laws–e.g., they are laws for disciplines not concerned with the sorts of scenarios 
where Newton’s laws yield widely inaccurate predictions. Many textbooks in engineering, 
biomechanics, etc. regularly make reference to ‘Newton’s laws’ and do so without any 
caveat.
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examples by appealing to disagreement among practicing scientists (e.g., 
about whether the law of demand is really a law). Like the first objection, 
this does not seem relevant, since the vast preponderance of such disa-
greements concern empirical matters (e.g., about how widely applicable 
the principle is), and not the meaning of calling such principles ‘laws’.17 
We may discover that none of the above principles are laws; nevertheless, 
this would fail to show any problem with the concept of weak law. Rather, 
such discoveries would reflect that the world was different than we had 
previously thought it was.
It is worth noting that all of the propositions listed above are false 
and hence, cannot be strong laws according to the criteria proposed in the 
previous section. Consider Newton’s laws, for instance. General relativity 
shows that these laws, if taken as descriptions of actual systems (e.g., the 
orbits of the planets around the sun, or of the moon around the earth) are 
false. General relativity also shows, of course, why and to what extent 
these laws can be used to provide approximately accurate predictions–
they are accurate of mid-sized bodies moving at speeds significantly less 
than the speed of light that are not subject to strong gravitational forces. 
Even in these cases, however, Newton’s laws are literally false; the onto-
logy it presumes simply does not exist in our world. The case with Boyle’s 
law is similar. The formula, which describes the relationship between pre-
ssure, volume, and temperature, is false. As was the case with Newton’s 
laws, however, it can be used to provide accurate predictions concerning 
certain types of systems–namely, those at relatively low temperatures and 
pressures. However, since its derivation depends on the assumption that 
gas particles have no volume, are subject to no intermolecular forces, etc., 
Boyle’s law does not actually describe any actual gas. The same can be 
said of each of the other principles–in each case, they are literally false 
if taken as descriptions of the real world systems to which they are com-
monly applied.18 Nevertheless, we have no problem in saying that these 
principles are ‘laws’ when considered in the correct contexts.
17 This is not to say, of course, that scientists never have semantic disputes about what 
ought to be called a ‘law.’ In most such cases, however, I suspect the underlying concerns 
are empirical–i.e., they concern the scope or usefulness of the principle in question. I 
suspect that few, if any, economists would take seriously the claim that the law of demand 
was not a law for the simple reason that no principle of economics is a law. To argue in 
such a manner would be to misconstrue the meaning of calling something a ‘law” in the 
context of economics.
18 Importantly, they are not all false for the same reason. Some weak laws are ide-
alizations or abstractions that are false because they fail to account for other forces, while 
others are more fundamentally mistaken. Moreover, as I will argue in the next section, it is 
possible for weak laws to be true.
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Earlier, I argued that strong laws share at least four distinctive cha-
racteristics: their correspondence with certain strict regularities, their 
objectivity and context independence, their preservation under certain co-
unterfactual suppositions, and their asymmetric relation to explanation. 
I will suggest that weak laws are characterized by lacking some but not 
all of the distinctive characteristics of strong laws, and by the way they 
approximate meeting other criteria. So, while there are no necessary or 
sufficient conditions for any particular principle counting as a weak law, 
there is a clear sort of “family resemblance” between strong laws and 
weak laws.
Some Weak Laws are False
I noted above that each of the sample weak laws described in the previ-
ous section is false. This suggests that the truth of propositions such as it 
is a weak law that L are compatible with L’s being false. The immediate 
objection to this, perhaps inspired by Fodor (1991) and Pietroski and Rey 
(1995), might go as follows: while the sentences listed above are false, 
one can produce true sentences by appending a ceteris paribus (CP) clause 
of the form “other things being equal.” Once this (already implicit) clause 
is tacked on, according to this story, one can see that the weak laws are 
true and do correspond to strict regularities in precisely the same way that 
strong laws do.19 So, for example, we should not understand what I’ve 
called “Fodor’s law” to be disproved by a person who forgoes satisfying 
his or her own desires in order to aid a family member; instead we should 
say that people will try to satisfy their desires only “other things being 
equal,” and note that a family member in distress counts as a case in which 
other things are not equal. If this were true, then Fodor’s law does corre-
spond to a strict regularity–its obtaining rules out the possibility of there 
being a case in which (1) a person did not seek to satisfy her own desires 
and (2) other things were equal (i.e., there were no interfering factors that 
could be blamed).
There are a number of reasons for doubting that the laws explicitly 
discussed in the special sciences can be made true by appending CP cla-
uses. So, for example, there is reason to think that CP clauses may render 
19 More importantly, at least for the defenders of CP-clauses, claims about laws in the 
social sciences can be confirmed or disconfirmed in the same manner as claims about the 
laws of physics. For instance, we can disprove claims about strong laws by discovering 
that the entailed regularities do not hold. Defenders of CP-clauses are committed to the 
idea that claims about “laws” in the social sciences can be disconfirmed in just the same 
manner. Laws of both sorts entail strict regularities; if these regularities are observed not to 
hold, then the purported law is not a law.
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a generalization vacuous (Earman et al., 2002, Woodward, 2002) and that 
the existence of such implicit clauses is incompatible with the way that 
the principles in questions are actually applied (Schiffer, 1991, Mitchell, 
2002). While I am sympathetic to these points, I think there is a simpler 
reason for denying the adequacy of such a solution: namely, many of the 
laws of the special sciences cannot be made true simply by appending 
ceteris paribus clauses. Consider the laws of Newtonian mechanics, for 
instance, which appear to be paradigmatic of the sorts of “laws” used in 
disciplines such as engineering or biomechanics (i.e., quantitative disci-
plines outside of fundamental physical theory). There is no simply sense 
in which these statements of such laws are true “other things being equal.” 
According to GR and QM, the relationship between mass, acceleration, 
and force posited by Newton’s laws would be false even if these were the 
only forces acting; it is not merely that Newton’s laws have left out rele-
vant forces (of the type that could be accounted for by a ceteris paribus 
clause). At best, one might argue that Newton’s laws are true in a certain 
sort of idealized case (e.g., they hold in a “perfectly” inertial reference 
frame), but one cannot coherently describe the ways in which actual situ-
ations differ from this ideal situation in terms of CP clauses that specify 
the ways in which actual situations differ from these ideal cases. After all, 
Newton’s laws deal with massive bodies, and these bodies will (of physi-
cal necessity) experience some gravitational effects.
The case is even worse for laws such as Galileo’s law of free-fall, 
which cannot coherently be described as being true even in an idealized 
case. After all, Newton showed that bodies in free fall do not accelerate at 
a constant rate at all, but that the acceleration due to gravity will change 
with the distance between the objects (i.e., gravity obeys an inverse square 
law). Galileo’s simply describes (roughly) the rate of acceleration experi-
enced by mid-sized bodies that happen to be in free-fall near the surface of 
the earth. Again, one could deny that Newton’s laws and Galileo laws are 
‘laws’ at all (even weak laws), but there is no evident reason to do so. Such 
laws are typical of the sorts of things that are often called “laws” in dis-
ciplines outside of fundamental physics. Such laws can be used to succe-
ssfully predict the behavior of falling bodies and support counterfactuals 
(had I dropped a stone off the roof, it would have fallen in accordance with 
Galileo’s law of free fall). They thus share certain other characteristics of 
strong laws; it is these similarities (and not a hidden CP clause) that makes 
them weak laws.
It is worth considering (especially given the examples offered above) 
whether weak laws are always false. If this were so, we might be able to 
offer a succinct explanation of the difference between strong laws and 
weak laws: the former are true and the latter are false. On closer inspec-
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tion, however, it does not seem obvious that weak laws must be false. 
One could, with some effort, cook up a close relation of Bode’s law that 
is literally true, and could be used to offer precisely accurate predictions. 
One might plausibly do something similar with Dollo’s law, which was for 
a time thought to correspond to a strict regularity. Even if one succeeded 
in reformulating these principles to guarantee their truth, however, it does 
not seem that one would have succeeded in uncovering a new strong law. 
Instead, one would merely have discovered a more accurate (and probably 
more unwieldy) version of an existing weak law. I think a better expla-
nation for the failure of such true weak laws to be strong laws cites their 
failure to meet the other criteria relevant to strong lawhood. It is to these 
criteria we will now look.
The Context-Dependence of Weak Laws
Some weak laws also violate the second criterion for strong lawhood–that 
is, claims about what is or is not a weak law do not depend solely on objec-
tive, context-independent matters of fact. To be more specific: it seems plau-
sible that there is a proposition WL and pair of contexts C1 and C2 such that
1. In C1, it is true that WL is a weak law, and
2. In C2, it is false that WL is a weak law.
One can easily see this sort of context-dependence of weak laws reflected 
in scientific discussions of paradigmatic weak laws. For example, in con-
texts where we are concerned with objects in free-fall near the surface of 
the earth, it seems appropriate to call Galileo’s law of free-fall a law, even 
though it obviously fails to be a strong law. Conversely, in contexts where 
we are concerned with objects in free-fall near the surface of the moon, 
Galileo’s law cannot appropriately be called a law of any type. Similarly, 
while Mendel’s law of inheritance plausibly counts as a weak law in a 
great many contexts, it would not count as a weak law for a research team 
interested in examining whether the inheritances of two specific alleles 
was actually independent. This sort of context-dependence does not oc-
cur with strong laws; so, for instance, there are no plausible examples of 
contexts in which no information can be transmitted faster than the speed 
of light does not count as a strong law.20
20 Lange (2000) offers various examples of laws that are laws only relative to some 
discipline or context. For example, he considers the case of Boyle’s law and van der Waal’s 
equation, both of which deal with the relation between pressure, volume, and temperature 
in ideal gases, and both of plausibly express laws (2000: 211–220). Since these laws gener-
ate inconsistent predictions, Lange claims that cannot both be laws in a single context.
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As another way of illustrating this point, consider how our claims 
about strong and weak laws might appear to the intelligent, but non-
human, inhabitants of a different planet. Our claims about strong laws 
would presumably be relatively straightforward: whatever claims about 
strong laws that are true for the inhabitants of such a planet would also 
be true for us, and vice versa. It seems highly plausible that, were we 
to encounter alien life, one of the major areas of mutual interest would 
concern finding out what the other party knew about the strong laws. 
The principles I have called “weak laws,” by contrast, might very well 
be of no interest to such beings. If the planet’s mass differed from that 
of earth, for instance, Galileo’s free-fall equations would fail to pro-
vide reasonably accurate predictions of the behavior of falling bodies; 
if the inhabitants’ neurology and psychology differently sufficiently 
from that of humans, then their system of economic exchanges might 
massively violate our law of supply and demand. If this were case, it 
would be inaccurate to claim that these principles were weak laws for 
these beings.
This context dependence of weak laws suggests that weak lawhood 
is tied closely to usefulness. Galileo’s free-fall principle, for instance, 
counts as a weak law just in those contexts in which it is expedient to 
use it for prediction. Similarly, the weak lawhood of folk-psychologi-
cal, economic, or biological principles will be manifested only in con-
texts where there is an interest in predicting the behavior of the various 
life-forms (human and non-human) that inhabit our planet. If this claim 
about weak laws is correct, then the truth of claims like it is a weak law 
that L may be in some sense subjective or context-dependent, even if the 
truth or falsity of L is entirely objective. Of course, it does not follow 
that one can make arbitrary propositions into weak laws merely by ma-
nipulating features of the context in which they are discussed. So, for 
example, one cannot by fiat make wildly inaccurate principles into weak 
laws simply by treating them as such. Similarly, there is a perfectly 
objective sense in which, given a particular context, something is either 
a weak law or it is not. Aristotle’s principle that massive bodies seek 
the center of the earth, for instance, represents an intuitive principle 
that many children (and uneducated adults) still appeal to on a regular 
basis. It is not, however, a plausible candidate for weak lawhood in any 
scientific context. This is because, in any context in which Aristotle’s 
principle might be used to issue predictions, there are a wide variety of 
other principles–Galileo’s law of free-fall, Newton’s law of gravitation, 
etc.–that fill the predictive role better than Aristotle’s principle does. 
The contrast here is not between truth and falsity—all three principles 
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are false—but between those principles that have legitimate scientific 
uses and those that do not.21
Weak Laws and Counterfactuals
In the previous section, I suggested that strong laws are characterized 
by a certain distinctive relationship to counterfactuals. In particular, I 
argued that a strong law would remain a strong law under any physically 
possible counterfactual supposition.22 This is plausibly false of all weak 
laws. For example, it does not seem that the law of demand would re-
main a law were human psychology to have evolved in a radically differ-
ent way than it actually has. This dependence upon physically contingent 
matters-of-fact is characteristic of weak laws. Many (if not all) of the 
laws of biology, psychology, economics, medicine, etc. depend upon the 
fact that life on earth evolved in a certain way; similarly, Newton’s laws 
serve the needs of engineers so well only because of certain (physically 
contingent) facts about the types of things we care about building. It is 
important to note that the capacity to support counterfactuals is inde-
pendent of the truth of the weak law in question. The problem is rather 
that, had certain physically contingent facts been different than they ac-
tually are, most weak laws would fail to provide even approximately 
correct predictions.
For an illustration of what I am talking about, consider the following 
counterfactual claims, all of which I take to be correct:
1. Were the curvature of space to be much more extreme than it actu-
ally is, Newton’s laws would not be weak laws.
2. If it were the case that humans wanted all and only goods that were 
in wide supply, the law of demand would not be a weak law.
3. If it were the case that there were a super-powerful being who 
periodically manipulated organisms’ s DNA to resemble their an-
cestors, Dollo’s law would not be a weak law.
21 I think it would be overly strong to claim that there are no contexts in which Aris-
totle’s principle is a weak law. It seems plausible, for instance, that this principle had legiti-
mate claim to being a weak law in the time before early modern physics made it obsolete. 
This is, again, in sharp contrast to strong lawhood; Aristotle’s principle is not and never 
was a strong law, even though it was widely believed to be so.
22 That is, if a counterfactual supposition is logically compossible with the strong 
laws remaining the laws, then the strong laws would continue to be the strong laws, were 
that counterfactual supposition to be the case. It is, of course, logically possible for the 
strong laws to be different; the only point here is that it isn’t physically (or nomologically) 
possible for them to be different.
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The important point here is not that there are some counterfactual an-
tecedents under which weak laws would cease to be weak laws (that is true 
of the strong laws, too), but that they would cease to be laws under physi-
cally possible counterfactual antecedents—i.e., under antecedents that are 
logically compossible with all the strong laws remaining strong laws.
While the weak laws fail to support counterfactuals in the distinctive 
manner that strong laws do, it is important to note the weak laws do su-
pport counterfactuals and that this support in some ways resembles the 
support to counterfactuals provided by strong laws. So, for instance, con-
sider each of the following counterfactuals, along with the weak law that 
supports it:
1. Were a pencil to fall off of my desk, it would accelerate at a rate of 
around 9.8m/sec2. (Galileo’s law)
2. Were Donald Trump to desire to acquire a 2004 Ford Taurus, he 
would undoubtedly own one. (Fodor’s law)
3. If demand for tulips were to be much higher than it currently is, the 
price of tulips would also be much higher. (Law of demand)
Our confidence that such counterfactuals are correct suggests that we are 
committed to weak laws supporting at least certain sorts of counterfac-
tuals. Some paradigmatic weak laws, such as Newton’s laws of motion, 
seem to be distinguished by the fact that their accuracy is preserved under 
the types of counterfactual antecedents that are of special interest to us.23 
It may be that there is no specific relation to counterfactuals possessed by 
all and only weak laws; instead, it seems that many weak laws support 
counterfactuals in a manner that is somewhat analogous to the way that 
strong laws do.
Weak Laws and Explanation
I previously argued that strong laws can be used in explanations but can-
not themselves be (scientifically) explained. Weak laws, conversely, may 
meet neither of these criteria. Many weak laws, including all of those of-
fered as examples, can be explained. For example, GR can explain why 
23 A number of authors have written on the relationship between counterfactuals and 
the principles appealed to in the special sciences. Lange (1999, 2000), for instance, argues 
that the laws of the special sciences have a relationship to the non-nomic facts of the their 
domain that precisely mirrors the relationship of the laws of physics to domain of physics. 
Skyrms (1980, 1995), Mitchell (2000), and Woodward (2003) have also offered accounts 
that, while not agreeing with Lange’s on specific details, concur in the conclusion that the 
principles of the special sciences relate to counterfactuals in a manner that resembles, but 
does not duplicate, the relationship between the laws of physics and counterfactuals.
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Newton’s laws hold for certain types of systems and facts about cellular 
biology and genetics underlie the truth of Dollo’s law. Even in those cases 
where we cannot currently explain a weak law’s obtaining, this seems to 
be merely a feature of our ignorance about the underlying mechanisms 
and not a fact about the nature of the world. Conversely, weak laws may 
themselves be of only limited explanatory value. In particular, many weak 
laws fail to explain their instances. So, for instance, one need not (and 
should not) appeal to Bode’s law to explain why a particular planet has the 
orbit that it does, nor does it seem profitable to cite Dollo’s law when one 
is asked why the traits of a particular organism differ from those possessed 
by a long-distant ancestor. This explanatory deficit obtains despite the fact 
that these principles are both predictively accurate and are relatively coun-
terfactually invariant. Instead, the problem seems to be that such laws are 
best understood as effects that are to be explained and not as fundamental 
facts that are to be appealed to in the explanation of other phenomena.24
Again, it should be stressed that appeals to weak laws can and do 
feature prominently in scientific explanations. The law of supply and de-
mand, for instance, can reasonably be cited in the explanation of many 
economic systems, and Newton’s laws can be cited in the explanations of 
a wide variety of phenomena. The point here is merely that many weak 
laws are the types of principles that can be explained, and that not every 
weak law can itself used to generate informative explanations.
Conclusion
I have argued that there are (at least) two distinct concepts of law relevant 
to understanding current and historical scientific practice: strong law and 
weak law. I have also offered preliminary characterizations of both con-
cepts, according to which strong laws must meet four specific criteria, 
while weak laws are distinguished by their failure to meet at least one of 
these criteria, and by their meeting (or approximately meeting) some of 
the remaining criteria.
As I have emphasized throughout, this account is intended primarily 
as a description of current scientific practice and not directly as a claim 
about the metaphysical and epistemological status of laws. I have not, for 
instance, attempted to argue that any weak or strong laws actually exist; 
nor have I offered an account of how claims about laws can be confirmed 
or disconfirmed. These are serious questions that any satisfactory account 
of laws must address. Nevertheless, I take it that this account has clear 
24 For a discussion of the way that the laws of psychology are often understood as 
effects, see Cummins (2000).
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consequences for current philosophical work on these questions. In parti-
cular, if my argument is correct, then there is reason to think that many of 
the most popular philosophical accounts of laws of nature are, at best, or-
thogonal to the concepts of law relevant to characterizing scientific prac-
tice, and in other cases, would seem to directly entail that scientists are 
massively mistaken in the way they conceive of laws. So, for example, I 
argued above that strong laws (if they exist) would clearly violate Humean 
Supervenience. I also suspect that their unique relation to counterfactuals 
means that strong laws do not supervene upon (and cannot be explained 
in terms of) powers, natures, or dispositions.25 For similar reasons, my 
account of weak laws suggest that there is little, if any, evidence to suggest 
that the social sciences makes widespread use of implicit ceteris paribus 
clauses of the sort that many philosophical accounts have posited.
While it would be implausible to require that philosophical accounts 
of laws of nature confine themselves to “mere” description and analysis 
of existing practice, the incredible success of scientific practice provides a 
strong prima facie case in favor of retaining our existing concepts of law 
of nature. In light of this, any philosophical accounts that would require 
abandoning or significantly revising these concepts is plausibly required 
to meet a heightened evidential burden. Of course, it may well turn out 
that the defenders of these accounts can meet this challenge. Whether or 
not they have successfully done so is worth considering.
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